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# The Grid Cannot Wait at the Gate
- URL: https://www.aixenergy.io/the-grid-cannot-wait-at-the-gate/
- Published: 2026-11-14T19:12:41.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-14T20:51:43.000Z
- Description: Officials say a routine job replacing copper wire with fiber at one remote site set off Friday's FAA ground stop. The fault is still undetermined, but utilities adding AI to their control rooms face a related risk where new systems meet old ones.
- Author: Brandon N. Owens
- Tags: Policy & Regulation, Cognitive Grid

Article Summary

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## Key points

- Friday's nationwide FAA ground stop, the longest in 25 years, began with routine work by L3Harris to replace copper lines with fiber at one remote site.
- A router there flooded the network with connection attempts, and instability appeared at 17 of the FAA's 22 en route centers. Officials have not yet determined whether the installer or the equipment was at fault.
- Officials saw no evidence of anything nefarious or AI-related, and said SMART, the FAA's new cloud-based planning system, had no impact.
- For utilities adding AI to control rooms, the lesson is to test the whole connected system under stress and to confirm that the grid can keep operating within known limits if the new tool fails.

On Friday afternoon the Federal Aviation Administration stopped departures at every airport in the United States. Its first statement, marked preliminary, cited communication issues affecting multiple air route traffic control centers, the facilities that handle aircraft between airports.[1](#note-1) The aircraft and runways were in working order. The trouble was in the telecommunications network that lets controllers coordinate thousands of flights at once. The FAA lifted the stop at 8:15 p.m. Eastern after more than four hours, the longest nationwide ground stop in 25 years.[2](#note-2) Departures resumed slowly, and airlines were still canceling flights into Saturday.[3](#note-3) By Saturday morning officials had traced the trouble to what the transportation secretary called routine maintenance at a single remote facility.[4](#note-4)

People who run power systems will recognize the distinction. A grid can have enough generation and intact wires and still become hard to operate safely if the data linking them arrives late or stops making sense.

The first explanation, given at the White House on Friday evening, was a broad one. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said old switches and routers in the FAA's telecommunications network had been overloaded with data and begun returning inconsistent information. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said the overload appeared to follow the installation of "new equipment and new technology," which "was overwhelming the older system," though neither man said what that equipment was.[5](#note-5)

On Saturday Duffy and Bryan Bedford, the FAA administrator, filled in the picture. L3Harris, the contractor that owns and runs the FAA's telecommunications network, had been doing what Duffy called "routine maintenance" at a remote FAA location on Friday, replacing old copper lines with fiber. During the changeover a router began flooding others in the air traffic control system with "over 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds," which disrupted radar feeds and communication with aircraft. Instability appeared at 17 of the network's 22 en route centers, although no facility went dark. "Once we were able to isolate the work being done at this location, all of our systems came back online," Duffy said.[6](#note-6) What officials could not yet say was why. Duffy asked whether L3Harris had made an installation error or had installed "a faulty router," and conceded that "we haven't determined what the fault was." Bedford framed the same question in terms of "a faulty installation," "a faulty configuration" or a bad piece of router technology. L3Harris did not immediately respond to requests for comment.[7](#note-7)

The equipment on the receiving end was not young. Government sources told CBS News on Friday that the trouble was confined to Cisco routers manufactured between 2001 and 2006.[8](#note-8) L3Harris is partway through moving the network from copper to fiber, and on November 2 it reported that about 70 percent of the network's roughly 4,400 sites had been upgraded, a share Bedford cited on Saturday.[9](#note-9) Both men described Friday's job as work to keep the existing system running. "This is ordinary, course-of-business stuff," Bedford said, and "not part of" the FAA's $12.5 billion modernization effort.[10](#note-10)

The timing had invited speculation about software. On November 10 the FAA announced that SMART, a cloud-based planning system that draws on about 200 data streams, would expand from its September debut in the Washington region to the airspace of all 22 of its en route centers. FAA specialists review SMART's scheduling recommendations, which go through the agency's command center to local facilities to consider.[11](#note-11) Mullin said on Friday that officials were looking into a possible link, and by that evening Duffy had ruled one out.[12](#note-12) On Saturday Duffy said SMART was "not tied into or connected to the systems that went down" and had "zero impact," while Bedford said officials saw "zero evidence of anything nefarious, and zero evidence of anything AI-related."[13](#note-13) Officials say they know where the trouble began, but why it began awaits a root cause analysis, which Bedford promised to share when it is finished.

For utilities, Saturday's account is more instructive than Friday's. Nothing novel was being switched on. A contractor was doing what Duffy called "pretty straightforward work" at "a very remote location," and whichever way the fault falls, a change at that one site unsettled facilities across the country.[14](#note-14) An upgrade can work as designed and still place demands on the equipment around it that the equipment cannot meet, and a faulty part or a configuration slip can do the same damage. An AI application arriving in a control room is, from the network's point of view, one more change of this kind. Modernization should be judged at those seams, where a new system meets the communications, hardware and procedures it depends on, and the routine jobs deserve the same scrutiny as the flagship projects.

## The machinery beneath the model

Pitches for grid AI usually start with what a model can improve, such as forecasting or dispatch. Less is said about where it runs. A model inside a utility has to pull measurements, exchange data with other applications and return something useful before the operator has to decide.

Picture an advisory tool that repeatedly queries the operational historian, the database that stores equipment measurements. It can read data but cannot issue commands. During a disturbance, events pile up, slow requests trigger retries and the retries add traffic. If the tool shares servers or network capacity with operational monitoring, the control room could see data more slowly even though the AI never touches a breaker. Calling software "advisory" says what it may do, but not how much load it can put on the systems around it. NIST's guidance on operational technology makes the underlying point: systems that interact with the physical world have performance, reliability and safety requirements that sit alongside security.[15](#note-15)

## An old lesson

The industry has lost its view of the system before. The investigation of the August 2003 blackout found that FirstEnergy's control room lost its alarm function that afternoon, and that this combined with inadequate tree trimming and other operating failures. Software was one part of a wider breakdown.[16](#note-16)

The task force's recommendations were practical. FirstEnergy was to test its transition to a new energy management system, train its operators on it and make sure its operating partners knew about the change. MISO was to make sure its IT staff did not change reliability tools without the awareness and consent of system operators.[17](#note-17) Those obligations read just as well for an AI deployment two decades later.

The risk now is that a new kind of software gets its own, lighter approval path. An innovation budget pays for the application while communications upgrades, operator training and recovery drills sit in someone else's plan. Each decision can look reasonable on its own, and the combined arrangement may never get the same scrutiny.

In *The Cognitive Grid*, I argue that authority delegated to software needs explicit limits, an accountable owner and a way to withdraw it, and that failures should be contained rather than allowed to spread through every connected function.[18](#note-18) Neither principle guarantees reliability. Both force an organization to write down what its new tool may do, what it depends on and how the rest of the system carries on without it.

## Where the analogy holds and where it breaks

Air traffic control and grid operation share a basic problem. Each has to serve demand within physical limits that shift with weather, outages and congestion, using information gathered across a large network, and each has to bring in new technology while the system keeps running. The analogy has limits, which Table 1 sets out.

Table 1\. Where the aviation analogy holds and where it breaks

| Operating issue              | Aviation                                                                                                       | Electric power, and the implication                                                                                                                                      |
| ---------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Information and upgrades** | Controllers depend on shared communications and surveillance. New equipment has to coexist with older systems. | Operators depend on telemetry, network models and communications. Test the connected installation under stress, including the existing systems that receive new data.    |
| **Operating authority**      | The FAA manages national traffic flow through its command center and regional facilities.                      | Utilities, balancing authorities and regional operators share responsibility across largely separate interconnections. Joint tests must cross organizational boundaries. |
| **Physical propagation**     | Aircraft are individually controlled; disruptions spread through schedules and airport capacity.               | Power redistributes across electrical paths when equipment trips, so disturbances can spread physically as well as through information systems.                          |
| **Reducing activity**        | Holding departures limits new traffic, but aircraft already airborne still need handling and have finite fuel. | Supply and demand must balance continuously. Reserves, storage and demand response give limited relief; protection may require interrupting customers.                   |
| **Time to intervene**        | Fast onboard protections coexist with slower traffic management and human decisions.                           | Some faults require action within fractions of a second. Keep protection independent and separate planning advice from direct control.                                   |
| **Fallback**                 | Restrict new departures while managing flights in the air.                                                     | Withdraw the new application while established controls continue. Test whether fallback still works when shared communications or supporting services fail.              |

Note: The power-sector implications are the author's recommendations, not findings about the FAA investigation.

*Sources: FAA; U.S. Energy Information Administration; U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force; AIxEnergy analysis.[19](#note-19)*

"Human oversight" needs an engineering specification. It should say who has authority, how much time they have, which controls continue automatically and whether the operator can still suspend the application if the network used to manage it has failed. A button on a screen does not answer those questions.

## Transitions already under way

Public filings from grid operators already show these dependencies. None of the documents below points to an FAA-like failure or a hidden defect, and most of the work they describe is ordinary market and control-system modernization, not AI. MISO offers the clearest parallel. In a March 2025 filing at FERC, it reported that its Weather Information Interface had gone live on February 13, 2025\. The same filing explained why forecast ambient-adjusted line ratings had to wait for MISO's new market-clearing engines: the ratings require more frequent and larger data transfers, and the planned energy management and limit-exchange upgrades would be incompatible with the legacy engine.[20](#note-20) MISO recorded a dependency and changed its sequence; it did not report an overload. It raises a fair question for similar projects, which is whether upgrades that generate data can outrun the systems that receive it.

PJM shows what it means to run several vendors in one control room. Its August 2024 operations roadmap describes a move to AspenTech's Monarch platform for supervisory control and automatic generation control in spring 2023, with network applications and model management on Siemens platforms and real-time markets on GE. PJM acknowledges the integration complexity and relies on middleware and smaller, more regular upgrades to manage it. Its preliminary 2026 budget lists further work on network applications, the model manager and market systems.[21](#note-21) The budget describes proposed work and does not confirm when any of it went live. The exposure worth testing is a partial upgrade that leaves dispatch and network analysis working from different models of the same grid.

In the West, CAISO and PacifiCorp launched the Extended Day-Ahead Market on May 1, 2026, coordinating day-ahead commitments and transmission use across a wider footprint.[22](#note-22) It involves no AI control. The test sits between organizations: if schedules arrive late or disagree, can each participant reconcile them and keep a workable operating plan?

At the distribution level, GE Vernova reports that Veitur, Iceland's largest utility, put its outage management system into service in the fourth quarter of 2025, linking smart-meter events with network models, customer data and grid operations. The vendor says the integration layer uses event rate limiting, filtering and throttling to protect the distribution management system from overload during outages.[23](#note-23) An outage can flood operators with meter messages just when they need clear information, and throttling has to hold back the flood without dropping urgent events.

The common thread is the dependency that falls between projects. A meter rollout can raise event traffic, a market reform can raise the frequency of data exchange, and a model upgrade can change what downstream software sees. The operating question is whether the combined system stays within its limits when several changes, a disturbance and a recovery happen together. Public documents rarely disclose spare capacity or the results of joint failure tests.

## What utilities should require

Requirements should scale with the consequences of failure. A tool that summarizes maintenance manuals and one that shapes real-time dispatch should not face the same bar, and an "advisory" label should not exempt a deeply connected tool from scrutiny. Thus, before any operational expansion, the utility should see the complete installation tested under bad conditions: delayed and missing telemetry, constrained bandwidth, bursts of requests, loss of outside services and recovery after an interruption. The pass mark should include whether existing operational functions keep their required performance.

Fallback should be exercised with the dependencies actually removed. If the application loses its cloud connection, the test should show what keeps working locally. If a software revision is rolled back, the utility should confirm that data formats, interfaces and procedures still match the earlier version. Restoring yesterday's code does not always restore yesterday's system. Shared suppliers deserve the same scrutiny, since two applications that look independent may rely on the same communications path or update mechanism and fail together.

Someone with operating responsibility also has to own the decision to proceed. Contracts should give the utility access to logs, notice of material changes and help reconstructing incidents. Vendors should back up their performance claims, but acceptance of the connected system belongs to the operator.

## The cost of admission

A grid AI business case should carry the communications capacity, integration, testing, monitoring, training and recovery capability needed to run the tool safely. If the return disappears once those costs are in, the original sums were incomplete.

Leaving old systems alone is not an option either. Duffy himself warned that the FAA's legacy equipment will keep failing until it is replaced, and the same is true of aging grid equipment. The job is to upgrade the supporting infrastructure and add new capabilities in an order that keeps service running, with enough evidence to justify each step.

The FAA still has to establish whether Friday's fault lay with the installer or the equipment, and why trouble at one remote site spread so widely. Bedford said that whatever the agency learns, "of course we will pivot in terms of how we do future sustainment."[24](#note-24) Utilities can ask the equivalent question now. If an AI application goes offline, misbehaves or stops trusting its inputs, can the grid keep operating within known limits? That can be tested before go-live, and the results belong in front of whoever approves the project.

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## Notes

1. Federal Aviation Administration, "FAA Statement," November 13, 2026, in "FAA General Statements," accessed November 14, 2026, [https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements/general-statements](https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements/general-statements?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-1)
2. Josh Funk and Will Weissert, "Trump Administration Blames 'Overloaded' Systems for Ground Stop after FAA Lets Flights Resume," Associated Press, November 13, 2026, [https://apnews.com/article/flights-halted-airports-faa-f81b0904331dafad6133f291e5f531a8](https://apnews.com/article/flights-halted-airports-faa-f81b0904331dafad6133f291e5f531a8?ref=aixenergy.io); Sean Duffy (@SecDuffy), "The nationwide ground stop lifted at 8:15pm ET," X, November 13, 2026, 9:15 p.m. Eastern, [https://x.com/i/status/2121426698172293310](https://x.com/i/status/2121426698172293310?ref=aixenergy.io); Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Control System Command Center, Advisory 005, "CNX Nationwide Ground Stop," November 14, 2026, 1:19 a.m. UTC (8:19 p.m. Eastern, November 13, 2026), [https://www.fly.faa.gov/adv/adv\_otherdis?adv\_date=11142026&advn=5](https://www.fly.faa.gov/adv/adv%5Fotherdis?adv%5Fdate=11142026&advn=5&ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-2)
3. Sean Duffy (@SecDuffy), "After restoring full functionality at our air traffic control centers and TRACONs, the @FAANews reopened the airspace tonight," X, November 13, 2026, 8:59 p.m. Eastern, [https://x.com/i/status/2121422750686310818](https://x.com/i/status/2121422750686310818?ref=aixenergy.io); Federal Aviation Administration (@FAANews), "The FAA lifted the ground stop and some flight departures are resuming," X, November 13, 2026, 10:05 p.m. Eastern, [https://x.com/i/status/2121439275539481030](https://x.com/i/status/2121439275539481030?ref=aixenergy.io); Clara Harter and Richard Winton, "What Caused the National Ground Stop? Here Is What We Know," *Los Angeles Times*, November 13, 2026, [https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2026-11-13/what-caused-national-ground-stop-here-is-what-we-know](https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2026-11-13/what-caused-national-ground-stop-here-is-what-we-know?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-3)
4. Ava Berger and Joel Rose, "FAA Ground Stop Ends but Passengers Stuck at Airport," NPR, November 14, 2026, [https://www.npr.org/2026/11/14/nx-s1-6040952/faa-ground-stop-airplane-travel](https://www.npr.org/2026/11/14/nx-s1-6040952/faa-ground-stop-airplane-travel?ref=aixenergy.io); Victoria Craw, Maegan Vazquez, and Liam Scott, "Work to Replace Old Wiring Led to Ground Stop, Transportation Secretary Says," *Washington Post*, November 14, 2026, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2026/11/14/ground-stop-aftermath-sees-thousands-flights-canceled-delayed-saturday/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2026/11/14/ground-stop-aftermath-sees-thousands-flights-canceled-delayed-saturday/?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-4)
5. Frank Konkel, "Legacy Tech Issue Led to FAA's Nationwide Ground Stop," Nextgov/FCW, November 13, 2026, [https://www.nextgov.com/modernization/2026/11/legacy-tech-issue-led-faas-nationwide-ground-stop/417232/](https://www.nextgov.com/modernization/2026/11/legacy-tech-issue-led-faas-nationwide-ground-stop/417232/?ref=aixenergy.io); Todd Bishop, "Officials Blame Aging FAA Telecom Gear as U.S. Airspace Reopens, See No Link to Microsoft or AI," GeekWire, November 13, 2026, [https://www.geekwire.com/2026/dhs-chief-sees-no-microsoft-link-to-faa-ground-stop-says-possible-ai-role-being-investigated/](https://www.geekwire.com/2026/dhs-chief-sees-no-microsoft-link-to-faa-ground-stop-says-possible-ai-role-being-investigated/?ref=aixenergy.io). These are officials' preliminary explanations, not investigation findings. [↩](#ref-5)
6. Craw, Vazquez, and Scott, "Work to Replace Old Wiring"; Justin Boggs, "What Caused the FAA Ground Stop? Officials Point to Router Failure during Update," Scripps News, November 14, 2026, [https://www.scrippsnews.com/life/travel/what-caused-the-faa-ground-stop-officials-point-to-router-failure](https://www.scrippsnews.com/life/travel/what-caused-the-faa-ground-stop-officials-point-to-router-failure?ref=aixenergy.io); Evan Semones, "US Blames System Upgrade for Longest Nationwide FAA Ground Stop since 9/11," Al Jazeera, November 14, 2026, [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/14/us-blames-system-upgrade-for-longest-nationwide-faa-ground-stop-since-9](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/14/us-blames-system-upgrade-for-longest-nationwide-faa-ground-stop-since-9?ref=aixenergy.io); Michael J. Shapiro, "Airlines Work to Recover Operations after Nationwide Ground Stop," Northstar Meetings Group, November 14, 2026, [https://www.northstarmeetingsgroup.com/News/Industry/airlines-work-to-recover-operations-after-nationwide-ground-stop](https://www.northstarmeetingsgroup.com/News/Industry/airlines-work-to-recover-operations-after-nationwide-ground-stop?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-6)
7. Jason Ma, "The White House Situation Room and National Security Apparatus Went into Action over FAA Problems," *Fortune*, November 14, 2026, [https://fortune.com/2026/11/14/faa-ground-stop-telecom-router-cybersecurity-white-house-situation-room-national-security-apparatus-l3harris/](https://fortune.com/2026/11/14/faa-ground-stop-telecom-router-cybersecurity-white-house-situation-room-national-security-apparatus-l3harris/?ref=aixenergy.io); Craw, Vazquez, and Scott, "Work to Replace Old Wiring"; Jennifer Bowers Bahney, "FAA Official Says 'Full Schedule Integrity' Expected by End of Sunday," Mediaite, November 14, 2026, [https://www.mediaite.com/media/news/faa-official-says-full-schedule-integrity-expected-by-end-of-sunday/](https://www.mediaite.com/media/news/faa-official-says-full-schedule-integrity-expected-by-end-of-sunday/?ref=aixenergy.io); Berger and Rose, "FAA Ground Stop Ends." [↩](#ref-7)
8. Kierra Frazier, Nicole Sganga, and Faris Tanyos, "FAA Lifts Nationwide Ground Stop That Disrupted Thousands of Flights; White House Says No Indication of 'Nefarious Act,'" CBS News, November 13, 2026, [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/faa-issues-nationwide-ground-stop/](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/faa-issues-nationwide-ground-stop/?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-8)
9. L3Harris Technologies, "FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)," accessed November 14, 2026, [https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/faa-telecommunications-infrastructure-fti](https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/faa-telecommunications-infrastructure-fti?ref=aixenergy.io); Berger and Rose, "FAA Ground Stop Ends." [↩](#ref-9)
10. Oriana Pawlyk, "'Incompetence' or Faulty Equipment? Duffy Blames Air Contractor and Demands $50B from Congress," *Politico*, November 14, 2026, [https://www.politico.com/news/2026/11/14/duffy-atc-presser-01166601](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/11/14/duffy-atc-presser-01166601?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-10)
11. Federal Aviation Administration, "SMART Expanding Across the Nation," November 10, 2026, in "FAA General Statements," accessed November 14, 2026, [https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements/general-statements](https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements/general-statements?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-11)
12. Bishop, "Officials Blame Aging FAA Telecom Gear." [↩](#ref-12)
13. Shapiro, "Airlines Work to Recover." [↩](#ref-13)
14. Berger and Rose, "FAA Ground Stop Ends"; Anthony Ha, "Transportation Secretary Blames 'Routine' Equipment Upgrade for Grounding Flights Nationwide," TechCrunch, November 14, 2026, [https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/14/transportation-secretary-blames-routine-equipment-upgrade-for-grounding-flights-nationwide/](https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/14/transportation-secretary-blames-routine-equipment-upgrade-for-grounding-flights-nationwide/?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-14)
15. Keith Stouffer et al., *Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security*, NIST Special Publication 800-82, rev. 3 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, September 2023), [https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r3](https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r3?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-15)
16. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, *Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations* (April 2004), chap. 5, [https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-16)
17. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, *Final Report*, 152–53\. [↩](#ref-17)
18. Brandon N. Owens, *The Cognitive Grid: Artificial Intelligence and the Governance of Delegated Power in Critical Infrastructure* (Independently published, 2025), chap. 8 and app. A. [↩](#ref-18)
19. Federal Aviation Administration, "NAS Operations," accessed November 14, 2026, [https://www.faa.gov/about/office\_org/headquarters\_offices/ato/service\_units/systemops/nas\_ops](https://www.faa.gov/about/office%5Forg/headquarters%5Foffices/ato/service%5Funits/systemops/nas%5Fops?ref=aixenergy.io); U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Electricity Explained: How Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers," accessed November 14, 2026, [https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php?ref=aixenergy.io); U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, *Final Report*, chaps. 2 and 6\. [↩](#ref-19)
20. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, "Motion for Extension of Time to Comply," FERC Docket No. ER22-2363-000, March 17, 2025, 7–11, [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/ER22-2363%20MISO%20Motion%20for%20Extension%20of%20Time685910.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/ER22-2363%20MISO%20Motion%20for%20Extension%20of%20Time685910.pdf?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-20)
21. PJM Interconnection, *Operations Road Map*, August 8, 2024, 2–3, [https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2024/20240808/20240808-item-06---2-external-operations-roadmap-document.ashx](https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2024/20240808/20240808-item-06---2-external-operations-roadmap-document.ashx?ref=aixenergy.io); Jim Snow, "Preliminary 2026 Project Budget" (presentation, PJM Planning Committee, September 9, 2025), slide 4, [https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/pc/2025/20250909/20250909-item-05---preliminary-pjm-2026-project-budget.pdf](https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/pc/2025/20250909/20250909-item-05---preliminary-pjm-2026-project-budget.pdf?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-21)
22. California Independent System Operator, "EDAM Is Live: PacifiCorp and CAISO Successfully Launch New Market May 1," news release, May 1, 2026, [https://www.caiso.com/about/news/news-releases/edam-is-live-pacificorp-and-caiso-successfully-launch-new-market-may-1](https://www.caiso.com/about/news/news-releases/edam-is-live-pacificorp-and-caiso-successfully-launch-new-market-may-1?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-22)
23. Stefano Vassena, "Veitur LV Management Journey with GridOS ADMS and GridOS Connect," GE Vernova, December 5, 2025, [https://www.gevernova.com/software/blog/veitur-lv-management-gridos-adms-oms](https://www.gevernova.com/software/blog/veitur-lv-management-gridos-adms-oms?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-23)
24. Hollie Silverman, "NY Governor Calls for Sean Duffy's Resignation after Air Travel Chaos," *Newsweek*, November 14, 2026, [https://www.newsweek.com/ny-governor-calls-for-sean-duffys-resignation-after-air-travel-chaos-12715897](https://www.newsweek.com/ny-governor-calls-for-sean-duffys-resignation-after-air-travel-chaos-12715897?ref=aixenergy.io). [↩](#ref-24)